to rioting. Negative (even racist) attitudes toward foreigners were very widespread in western European countries in the 1980s and 1990s, yet only Germany had antiimmigrant riots.8 Moreover, eastern Germany in the early 1990s did not have generally higher levels of xenophobia than western Germany, but the riots occurred only in the east, where rates of antiforeigner violence were also much higher.9 Racism and xenophobia are obviously necessary conditions for antiminority riots, but the prevalence of such attitudes sufficient to produce riots seems low enough to be widespread. Because xenophobic attitudes comprise a poor explanatory factor of crosssectional differences, and because local attitudinal data are basically nonexistent in Germany, this hypothesis will not be pursued further.
Ethnic Competition and Economic Grievances Ethnic competition theory has been widely applied to ethnic conflict, including antiminority riots.1o The theory holds that competition for scarce resources between dominant and subordinate ethnic groups, due, for example, to increases in immigration or unemployment, leads to riots and other violence as the dominant group tries to protect or advance its material interests. This theory might account for the eastern German riots, since eastern Germany experienced massive increases in unemployment after unification and small inflows of foreigners in the early 1990s. The first hypothesis is that antiminority riots will take place in locations and at times with unusually high or rising unemployment rates and immigrant population shares, since in those areas the competition for jobs and housing is most intense.
Cultural Conflicts Park has argued that a minority group's differences in appearance and in culturally rooted customs initially produce an apprehensive, defensive reaction from native populations, in places where the natives have little experience in interacting with ethnic strangers."1 Building on this idea, Husbands suggests that initial interactions between ethnic groups are prone to spark conflicts that arise from different customs relating, for example, to noise, sanitation, dress, sexual relations, and religious practices and that these conflicts can lead to territorial riots between ethnic groups.12 Riots are especially likely when actual differences in cultural practices become exaggerated by racist or ethnonationalist stereotypes and rumors. The second hypothesis is that cultural conflicts spurred by the relatively recent arrival of new ethnic groups become acute in the period before the beginning of rioting and that large-scale violence grows out of these cultural conflicts.
The cultural conflicts theory suggests a link between immigration and rioting in eastern Germany that differs from that proposed by ethnic competition theory. In both cultural conflicts and ethnic competition members of the dominant group are offended or threatened by what they perceive as efforts by the minority group to improve its position at the expense of the dominant group.13 But in cultural conflicts scarce economic resources are not at stake, and the sources of conflict might be removed through communication and experience. National and Subnational Political Opportunities The other main dimension of political opportunity structures concerns opportunities, that is, the probability that action by challengers will help them achieve an outcome they desire, such as driving out the minority group.20 Opportunities will appear to be greater if political elites publicly support antiminority positions, suggesting that further antiminority mobilization, including riots, might tip the balance in favor of antiminority decisions by government. For example, opportunities rise if political elites engage in public debates about immigration control policies, suggest that ethnic minorities might be removed from a locality, give a hearing or other support to antiminority groups, or make public statements hostile to the minority group. Many authors have argued that national politicians encouraged the 1990s riots in Germany by advocating restrictions on asylum rights.21 The fourth hypothesis is that antiminority riots occur only after national political elites show, through public statements or actions, that they share potential rioters' opposition to the presence of the ethnic minority.
However, subnational elites may also be important in creating antiminority opportunities.22 Local government is relatively easily accessible to groups that are weakly organized and poor in material resources. Local politicians are often the first to respond to emerging issues, and they may be more willing than national politicians to make antiimmigrant or racist statements.23 Moreover, in Germany as in many countries regional and local authorities have substantial power over where minority populations are housed. The fifth hypothesis is that antiminority riots occur only after subnational political elites increase apparent opportunities by signaling that they share potential rioters' opposition to the presence of the ethnic minority. Where subnational officials control the police, as in Germany, such signals may also encourage rioting by shifting the pattern of facilitation, as posited in the third hypothesis. who were living in East Germany before unification. In addition, about 1.6 million ethnic German resettlers arrived from eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and its successor states in this period, with constitutional rights to automatic German citizenship; they were immediately classified as German.31 Asylum seekers were attracted by rights embedded in the German constitution and courts that allowed them to remain in the country for many years while their cases were decided.32 Skinheads, other youths, and neo-Nazis carried out an average of 400 arson attacks and 1,300 other violent crimes against foreigners per year from 1991 to 1993, about a tenfold increase from the 1980s; attacks dropped sharply after 1993, as did immigration. 33 The main targets of attacks were asylum seekers, who were distributed to the eastern states beginning in 1991. In the east victims of antiminority violence after unification also included foreign laborers from Africa and Vietnam who had been recruited by the East German government and were to remain in the eastern part of unified Germany until their multiyear labor contracts expired. By far the most important attacks were the riots at Hoyerswerda and Rostock. Their duration, intensity, and number of participants made them the most serious antiminority attacks in postwar Germany and were reflected in their political significance. 34 Hoyerswerda and Riesa counties lie within the eastern state of Saxony, which had the third highest per capita rate of antiforeigner violence among all German states in 1991 . 35 Yet over half of Saxony's fifty-four counties and independent cities had no publicly reported attacks against the dwellings of foreign workers and asylum seekers during the peak periods of violence in the state.36 Among the low violence counties, Riesa is comparable with Hoyerswerda on many key dimensions. Both had a medium degree of urbanization, similar unemployment rates, a medium number of foreign residents, a relatively large group of asylum seekers, a relatively large group of right-wing skinheads, similar levels of skinhead action, and local government effectively dominated by a grand coalition of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Social Democratic Party (SPD). 37 In combining low violence with these structural features, Riesa is representative of many other localities in eastern Germany. Within Saxony there was little antiforeigner violence during the period studied in ten out of the nineteen localities (53 percent) that had large skinhead groups, in sixteen out of the twenty-nine localities (55 percent) that had stable or increasing shares of foreigners, and in thirteen out of the twenty-two localities (59 percent) that housed at least fifty asylum seekers by the end of 1993.38 By controlling for minority populations, unemployment, and skinhead organization, the Hoyerswerda-Riesa comparison focuses on the potential effects of cultural conflicts, the channeling of participation, the facilitation of violence, and local political opportunities. The hypotheses regarding ethnic competition and national opportunities will be tested by examining evidence internal to each case, by comparing riot cases to the rest of eastern Germany, and by analyzing temporal developments.
Riots in Hoyerswerda versus Peaceful Ethnic Relations in Riesa
Foreigners and Antiforeigner Violence in Hoyerswerda and Riesa Hoyerswerda and Riesa were similar in many respects. Foreign laborers, mainly from Mozambique and Vietnam, had lived in Hoyerswerda county since the early 1980s; they worked mainly in the locally dominant coal industry, on three-year labor contracts. In addition, about 230 asylum seekers from over twenty countries, principally Romania, the former Yugoslavia, and Ghana, were moved into the city of Hoyerswerda by Saxon and local authorities in spring 1991.39 Riesa in 1991 was an industrial county dependent on a few large employers in the steel industry. In Riesa, too, the East German government had brought hundreds of foreign workers from Mozambique, Vietnam, and Angola. During 1991 260 asylum seekers from at least twelve countries arrived in Riesa county, as did 200 ethnic German resettlers. 40 On September 17, 1991, right-wing skinheads began sustained, large-scale attacks on foreigners in Hoyerswerda. Attacks against the foreign workers continued for four days and were followed by three days during which crowds massed outside the asylum seekers' housing, located in a different neighborhood about three kilometers distant. 41 The attackers used bottles, chains, clubs, baseball bats, and molotov cocktails, threatened to burn down the building, and said they would continue their attacks until the foreigners left. At the height of the rioting fifty to one hundred youths attacked the foreigners' housing, while crowds of 500 or more adults watched, shouted slogans, cheered, and hindered police. The attacks against the foreign workers continued until police massed outside their housing, and the attacks against the asylum seekers continued until authorities removed the victims from Hoyerswerda county to undisclosed locations in Saxony.
The violence was directed mainly against the foreign workers, whose housing was heavily attacked night after night, while the actions against the asylum seekers took the form of a siege and threats rather than heavy violence. Nonetheless, the Hoyerswerda riots strengthened national political forces that sought to restrict asylum rights. The national leaders of the CDU and the Christian Social Union (CSU), which governed in Bonn in a coalition with the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), used the riots to pressure the opposition SPD to accept a constitutional amendment that would reduce asylum applications.42 To the present day, Hoyerswerda is a widely recognized symbol of the popular rejection of asylum seekers in Germany.
Riesa had an active skinhead group of twenty to thirty-five youths, yet through the end of 1993 they did not carry out a single concerted attack against the residences of asylum seekers or other foreigners living in the county. Skinheads tried to attack Riesa's asylum hostel several times, but each attempt remained unsupported by neighbors, was aborted, and damaged little property. For example, in September 1992, in the wake of the Rostock riots and in the middle of a large wave of attacks on foreigners' hostels throughout Germany, thirty to forty youths from the residential area around the Riesa county asylum hostel assembled outside it. They were met by a large police presence. After police and youths waited for two hours, the group dissolved, and the youths went home.43
Ethnic Competition and Violence in Eastern Germany
The hypothesis concerning ethnic competition for material resources receives little support from these cases. The antiforeigner riots in the eastern states occurred during a major economic crisis there. The introduction of West German currency caused industrial production to drop by about two-thirds during the second half of 1990; the real rate of unemployment, including those out of work and on short hours, reached about 29 percent in July 1991.44 After more than forty years of a command economy with guaranteed employment, the subjective sense of economic insecurity was intense for many eastern Germans.
However, the antiminority riots did not occur in the most objectively distressed areas of eastern Germany.45 Hoyerswerda county's unemployment rate was several percentage points below the average for Saxony, and youth unemployment there actually dropped by a third from July through October 1991. Rostock's unemployment rate was also below average.46 Furthermore, although unemployment was rising, there was actually very little job competition between the foreigners and the native population in Hoyerswerda. The foreign workers had the most dangerous and dirtiest jobs, which Germans normally were unwilling to take, for example, working around phenol in the local coal processing plant.47 Asylum seekers in Germany were completely banned from employment until July 1991 and after then could receive work permits only if it could be shown that no European Community citizen could do the job. In Hoyerswerda asylum seekers were not even required to do community work in exchange for social assistance, since local officials wanted to reserve any such work opportunities for Germans.48 "Foreigners take our jobs away" was nevertheless a frequent complaint of Hoyerswerda residents. Perceived grievances may be necessary for antiminority riots, but subjective perceptions of ethnic competition can also be produced in the absence of objective competition. Finally, German residents were not threatened by large numbers of ethnic minorities. Even after two years of immigration, at the end of 1992 the foreign population share in eastern Germany was only 2.8 percent, compared with 9.4 percent in the relatively low violence western part of the country. The foreign population of Hoyerswerda actually declined during the nine months before the riots; it was 36 percent lower in the city in August than it had been at the start of 1991, because more foreign workers went home than asylum seekers arrived.49 Nor were foreigners competing with Germans for apartments in Hoyerswerda, which had a housing surplus due to an overall decline in population. Indeed, both the foreign workers and the asylum seekers in Hoyerswerda were living in buildings that had been occupied for years by foreign laborers, not by Germans. In housing the potential for ethnic competition was actually greater in Riesa. There the total number of foreigners was stable during 1991, and housing was scarce, with 3,500 households seeking apartments that year.50
Cultural Conflicts in Eastern Germany
The differences in violence between Hoyerswerda and Riesa are much more closely related to differences in cultural conflicts. In the city of Hoyerswerda the presence of small numbers of foreigners concentrated in the densely populated Neustadt section led to cultural conflicts, mainly between the foreigners and their immediate neighbors. Small-scale conflicts between Germans and the foreign workers had occurred in the 1980s, but larger conflicts were suppressed until after the East German state collapsed.51 Civil liberties were effectively introduced in 1989-90, after hard-line Communist Party chairperson Erich Honecker resigned in October 1989, the police and secret police stopped enforcing Communist-era discipline, and competitive national elections were held in March 1990.
Suddenly, eastern Germans' dissatisfaction with foreigners could be expressed much more freely. In contrast, the foreigners' views about the cultural practices of their German neighbors did not become the topic of political conflicts and newspaper reporting, due to their much weaker social and political position. The main complaints by Germans in Hoyerswerda concerned late night noise, garbage, and reckless driving by foreigners; other complaints concerned sexual relations between foreign men and German girls or young women.52 The foreign workers and asylum seekers were housed in groups of over one hundred, thus concentrating the behaviors that many Germans found offensive, threatening, or incomprehensible. The problems were intensified by high density housing. Some Germans lived in the same twelve story apartment complex occupied by the foreign workers, and many others lived in adjoining or immediately neighboring buildings. Conflicts over noise were exacerbated by the Germans' day work schedules, while many foreign laborers worked late shifts and the asylum seekers had much free time since they were not permitted to work at all.
The Hoyerswerda riots were closely related to these cultural clashes. In September 1991, as most foreign workers were preparing to leave for their countries of origin, noise from their farewell party, described as especially loud, bothered their German neighbors. A few days later these neighbors formed the bulk of the crowds that participated in the first nights of rioting. Moreover, when skinheads attacked Vietnamese at the start of the September 1991 riots, Mozambicans counterattacked by throwing objects from the roof of their building. The sight of black men fighting German youths frightened or outraged some Germans and helped to draw large crowds sympathetic to the skinheads who attacked the Africans.
The cultural conflicts between asylum seekers and their neighbors in Hoyerswerda were exacerbated by public policies adopted by both the East German regime and the Federal Republic of Germany. In East Germany the state actively discouraged and prevented social interaction between foreign workers and the German population.53 Therefore, conflicts between Germans and foreigners were not tempered by friendships or channeled into nonviolent forms along preexisting lines of communication. Furthermore, when asylum seekers arrived in Hoyerswerda, local officials treated them according to policies adopted by West Germany's state and federal governments during the 1980s: the ban on employment, a requirement that asylum seekers live in hostels and stay within the county to that they were assigned, and inadequate personnel to mediate between them and their German neighbors.54 These policies were intended to deter asylum seekers from coming to Germany, but they also exacerbated cultural conflicts by concentrating the foreigners and limiting their normal economic and social contacts with Germans. Together with the decision to transfer asylum seekers to many small localities in eastern Germany, these policies set the stage for widespread cultural conflicts.
In a similar way the intense riots at Rostock grew out of cultural conflicts between several hundred asylum seekers, mainly Romas, and their German neighbors. The Rostock asylum hostel was badly overcrowded. Asylum seekers had to camp on the lawns outside the building, prompting their German neighbors to complain repeatedly about noise, dirt, begging, and gambling on the street.55 Residents' complaints eventually led to an anonymous call in the local newspapers for a demonstration against asylum seekers. The riots began the next day when a crowd of 150 gathered outside the hostel. 56 In Riesa cultural conflicts between Germans and foreigners were much more limited. Conflicts did occur over the theft of car radios later found in the asylum hostel, begging by gypsy children in the streets, and illegal trading by Vietnamese.57 But in Riesa the conflicts between Germans and asylum seekers did not become matters of sustained public attention in which the skinheads could have intervened and found a sympathetic adult German audience. County officials housed the asylum seekers in former workers' barracks on the edge of Zeithain, a town of 4,500 people about five kilometers from the county's largest city; in contrast to Hoyerswerda, large numbers of German neighbors did not immediately adjoin the asylum seekers' building. Although Riesa county was also home to over 600 other foreigners, mainly laborers, the only conflicts between them and Germans were two small-scale attacks by skinheads against foreign businesses.58
The Channeling and Mischanneling of Political Participation Hoyerswerda and Riesa strongly support the channeling hypothesis. In Hoyerswerda at the time of the 1991 riots citizen participation mechanisms, such as public hearings, public dialogues between citizens and officials, and citizen attendance of city or county council meetings, were very limited. During all of 1991 Hoyerswerda residents were publicly invited to only four meetings.59 In late August, however, city councilors hastily called a public forum to deal with conflicts surrounding the asylum seekers' hostel. This heated two hour meeting began to create nonviolent channels through which the asylum seekers' neighbors could participate. Officials made some concessions and promised another meeting with residents; moreover, they advised the neighbors on how to report legal violations such as excessive noise to the authorities. After unification these violations needed to be reported to the town clerk's office (Ordnungsamt) rather than to the police, as had been the practice under the Communist government. Before the August meeting most residents of Hoyerswerda did not understand the new process or the failure of the police to respond to their complaints.60
By contrast, there was no public meeting for the Germans who lived near the foreign workers, and those Germans did not learn about the procedure to make complaints about their non-German neighbors. These differences in political participation and political information can explain why the rioting was much more intense against the foreign workers in Hoyerswerda.61 Moreover, the conflicts between the foreign workers and their German neighbors went back at least several years, compared with several months of conflicts between the asylum seekers and their neighbors.
While nonviolent channels were extremely limited or nonexistent, political participation was channeled into violence in Hoyerswerda during 1991. Skinheads learned that they could attack foreigners with near impunity; hence many adult German residents came to see the skinheads' methods as the most reliable ones for "doing something about the foreigners."62 Moreover, skinheads gained visibility and a degree of legitimacy through vigilante activities that were tolerated by the police and greeted by the population. While crime was rapidly rising during winter 1990-91, a neoNazi group of about ten skinheads (Neue Deutsche Ordnung) was formed. The group patrolled Hoyerswerda streets, offered fearful women rides home late at night, took action against burglars and auto thieves, and sometimes handed their victims over to the police. 63 Crucially, Hoyerswerda police did not seriously interfere with the assault against the foreign workers' housing on the first few nights of rioting in September. A force level of one hundred police officers was not reached until the third night of rioting; the foreign workers' housing was not cordoned off until the fourth day; and eyewitnesses reported that the police were passive and scared. Deliberate police passivity was even more evident in the Rostock riots, where police forces and equipment were adequate in size yet police inaction during the first three nights of rioting was remarkable. Eventually police forces withdrew completely for two hours, allowing seventy youths to set on fire a building housing over one hundred foreign workers, all of whom miraculously escaped over the rooftops. 64 The extreme failure of policing in Hoyerswerda was due in part to difficulties caused by the collapse of the Communist system and the unification process. As the old regime's secret police was disbanded, the regular local police forces proved to be inadequately trained and equipped to deal with crime in a society no longer controlled by the Communist Socialist Unity Party.65 However, the police failure in Hoyerswerda was due also to the lack of a will to intervene decisively against skinheads and crowds of Germans on behalf of foreigners. While the lack of will was apparent at all levels, the Saxon interior minister, Rudolf Krause (CDU), played a key role by frequently downplaying right-wing violence and showing obvious uninterest in protecting foreigners. In Hoyerswerda he announced that he wanted to avoid a large police action and that asylum seekers should be fenced in or evacuated to an army building in a neighboring county. 66 In Riesa, by contrast, cultural conflicts did not flare up dramatically in part because political participation was channeled into nonviolent forms. Violence against foreigners was repeatedly and speedily suppressed by the police, while channels for citizen participation in many areas were abundant. The skinheads therefore pursued other targets, and the other youth and adult citizens of Riesa did not act with pronounced open hostility toward the county's ethnic minorities.
Riesa's police acted decisively against right-wing youths almost every time they engaged in violence. In particular, police did not allow skinheads to employ vigilantism or to dominate the streets during any period. There were seven occasions during 1991 when police prevented rioting by large numbers of right-wing youths.67 Police interfered especially with skinhead attacks against foreigners. For example, police turned up with a large force when the asylum hostel was approached by thirty to forty hostile youths in September 1992. Unable to act effectively against such a welldefended target, the skinheads tended to seek victims among leftists and punkers in bars and discos, where the police were more reserved and the private owners or managers could not maintain order. 68 Police acted more effectively in Riesa largely because their leaders were interested in combatting right-wing crime. Therefore, the officers learned how to deal with it much earlier, more quickly, and more thoroughly than the police in Hoyerswerda. Riesa's police experienced the institutional difficulties typical of eastern German police forces, and they confronted high and dramatically increasing general crime rates after unification. Hoyerswerda and Riesa counties had similar crime rates and similarly low rates at which crimes were solved.69 But Riesa's police were successful in their priority areas, including the investigation of murders (seven out of seven cases solved in one period) and the suppression of crimes by right-wing youth. 70 The successes of Riesa's police were partly due to the practical, persistent, and remarkably open-minded way they responded to their challenges. Police leaders in Riesa were open and communicative with the press, were willing to admit mistakes, and called on the public for cooperation. 71 The nonviolent channels of participation in Riesa were as open as the violent ones were blocked. Citizens groups were quite active, and the number of nonviolent demonstrations, strikes, and petitions circulated was about three times as large as in Hoyerswerda.72 Furthermore, Riesa officials normally held hearings and discussions on a wide range of local public policy issues; in 1991 there were seventeen political meetings of all kinds in Riesa, four times the number held in Hoyerswerda, with topics such as "the problems of youth in our city" and noise from a disco. These kinds of citizen participation are an indicator of the overall relations between citizens and local authorities. It is likely that any neighbors of the Riesa county asylum hostel who were dissatisfied with the behavior of the hostel's residents would have felt comfortable approaching either the county employees managing the hostel, the police, or the elected officials of the town of Zeithain or Riesa county. National Political Opportunities There is little evidence that the national debate on asylum rights accounts for the timing of the six major antiminority riots in eastern Germany in 1990-92. Most obviously, there is little correlation between the debate and the riots. The Hoyerswerda and Rostock riots, the most serious of these events, occurred during relative lulls in the asylum debate.73 There are several other reasons to conclude that national political opportunities had little effect on the Hoyerswerda, Rostock, and other eastern German riots. First, the national asylum debate was relatively unimportant in eastern Germany. For example, the tabloid Bild (Dresden edition) failed to cover the debate at all during the two months prior to the Rostock riots, and the Rostock newspapers also carried few stories. Furthermore, eastern Germans consistently named economic problems as much more important than issues related to foreigners, also in the periods just before the riots. 
Local Political Opportunities
By contrast, local political opportunities for antiforeigner mobilization increased just before the Hoyerswerda and Rostock riots. Local authorities in Hoyerswerda showed tacit support for antiimmigration positions in three ways. First, county and city authorities were passive and inattentive toward the issue of foreigners, although not openly opposed to the minorities. The officials' passivity helped create a political vacuum on the issue, making it easier for the skinheads to assert an issue monopoly during the months leading to the riots.76 Second, when local politicians and county administrators did address the issue at the citizens forum a month before the riots, they seemed to open opportunities for those who wanted to advance the agenda to expel foreigners. At that meeting acting mayor Klaus Naumann (SPD) told the angry crowd that he would talk with other officials about possibly moving the asylum seekers and would hold another meeting a month later.77 He thereby opened the possibility of removing the asylum seekers from the neighborhood even as he was trying to channel residents' participation into negotiations and legal channels rather than violence. A similar pattern occurred in Rostock, where a city official, Peter Magdanz (SPD), tried to mediate between disgruntled residents and the wholly unresponsive city and state governments. Although he sought a nonviolent solution, Magdanz's calls to have the asylum hostel moved to another neighborhood probably increased expectations that the asylum seekers could be forced out violently.78 Third, two widely reported police actions against foreigners by the Hoyerswerda police strengthened the antiforeigner agenda by creating the impression that someone in authority was finally willing to act against the foreigners. 79 In particular, in early July 1991 120 police from several counties conducted a highly publicized raid of Vietnamese cigarette dealers on the Hoyerswerda marketplace, arresting nineteen Vietnamese and one Turk. These arrests seem to have influenced the skinheads' choice of targets. Two months later the riots were touched off when eight skinheads attacked a group of Vietnamese traders on the street where they normally sold untaxed cigarettes.
By contrast, local opportunities for skinheads to influence in-migration by foreigners were quite small in Riesa, as official statements and actions were mainly educational and proforeigner. When asylum seekers arrived, Riesa's authorities initiated a small information campaign, designed to reduce prejudices and gain the natives' acceptance. During 1991-93 authorities held three meetings with German residents about asylum seekers (including a heated five hour discussion with soldiers at the Zeithain army base) and supported publication of several informative articles about asylum seekers in the local newspaper.80 Social Movement Organizations: Skinhead and Neo-Nazi Groups The organizational basis for antiminority violence was certainly present in Hoyerswerda, Rostock, and Riesa. A network of skinhead groups had become established in both East and West Germany during the late 1980s and had grown to about 6,500 participants, 3,000 of them in eastern Germany by 1991.81 These groups, consisting mainly of working-class teenage boys and increasingly under the influence of neo-Nazi organizations in this period, emphasized group loyalty, hostility toward adult society, and violence against relatively weak groups, especially foreigners and leftists. The network of skinhead groups in Hoyerswerda was stronger than in most places in Saxony. The instigators of violence included a hard core of about thirty youths who used neo-Nazi symbols and slogans and were prone to violence and another twenty sympathizers who were friends of hardcore members.82 In Rostock, too, a large group of local skinheads and right-wing youths was involved in the riots. Moreover, on the second night of rioting, skinheads and neo-Nazis came to Rostock from other cities in Germany. They brought hardcore leadership and aggressive tactics, such as setting cars on fire to create barricades. 83 Nonetheless, Riesa shows that organized and active perpetrators are not sufficient to produce antiminority riots or significant antiminority violence. Although Riesa skinheads formed a relatively large group and were at least as criminally active as their counterparts in Hoyerswerda (eleven skinhead crimes against all targets reported over a fifteen month period in Riesa compared with eight in Hoyerswerda), most of the Riesa skinheads' actions were attacks on leftist youth or on train and bus stations.84
Conclusions: Immigration, Democratization, and Antiminority Riots
In the early 1990s eastern Germany underwent a transition to democracy, immigration, and a series of antiforeigner riots. Analyzing this setting can provide insight into the processes that link both recent immigration and transitions away from authoritarian rule to antiminority riots. The evidence from eastern Germany points to local political processes, not ethnic competition or national opportunities, as the main causes of the riots. In-migration by ethnic minorities led to riots in those localities where cultural conflicts were heightened by specific housing practices, residents' participation was mischanneled, local opportunities for antiminority politics were provided, and social movement organizations mobilized support.
In eastern Germany the local processes that linked migration to riots were made much more likely by the rapid, chaotic transitions to both representative democracy and a market economy during German unification. These transitions created many major tasks and problems simultaneously, such as economic privatization and the reconstruction of public administration. Distracted by these matters, many state and local officials failed to respond effectively to the conflicts between Germans and foreign minorities by housing foreigners carefully, creating channels for nonviolent participation, and decisively policing the skinhead groups. However, as Riesa illustrates, many local and state officials in eastern Germany did respond effectively. The political failures also occurred at the subnational and not only the national level.85
Where attempts to extend democratic rights are accompanied by the collapse of state authority over an ethnically diverse population, antiminority riots often result. 3. Antiminority riots include events where the subordinate group fights back to a greater or lesser degree but exclude those where only the subordinate group engages in sustained attacks. For more specifics on size, see note 7.
